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The Fog of War
Large-Scale Smoke Screening
Operations of First Canadian Army in
Northwest Europe 1944-1945
James C. Bond
moke screens have been employed in
sea and land warfare for many
centuries for a variety of purposes. They
have been used to conceal troop
movements, to deceive the enemy as to
combat strengths, points of attack, and
preparations for offensive operations.
During the Second World War all armies
made use of smoke screens in their
operations to a greater or lesser extent. Canada
was no exception and was considered to be
extremely innovative in the use of smoke
equipment in ways for which it was not designed.
The First Canadian Army first employed largescale non-artillery-projected smoke screens
during the campaign in Northwest Europe. For
the first time, at least in the history of Canadian
operations, units of trained specialists worked
to lay down smoke screens in the field.

S

Background
ilitary smoke screens are basically clouds
of particles which are effective in absorbing,
reflecting and/ or refracting light rays. In NorthWest Europe the Canadians used two different
materials to produce major smoke screens.

M

The first was zinc chloride. Zinc or zinc oxide
reacts with chlorinated hydrocarbons, such as
carbon tetrachloride or hexachlorethane, to
produce a zinc chloride vapour which condenses
in the air to create an effective white smoke. There
were, and still are, a number of different
formulations, all of which were known as "HC"
smokes (for HydroCarbon). In addition to being
employed in a variety of artillery shells, mortar
bombs, and hand grenades, HC was employed

in smoke generators, commonly known
as "smoke pots." The best known
examples of these was the British No.24
Smoke Generator, weighing about 40
pounds and burning (emitting smoke) for
12 to 15 minutes, and the U.S. Army M4
floating smoke pot, similar to the No.24
in weight and smoke production
characteristics, but fitted with a flotation
chamber.
The second was oil smoke. Three different
kinds of oil smoke generators have been used in
modern warfare. An effective smoke can be
produced by injecting oil into the hot exhaust of
a vehicle, the oil condensing in the air to form a
smoke cloud. Some naval vessels could produce
this type of screen, which became known as a
"Destroyer Screen." The British developed an oil
smoke generator which partially burned and
partially vapourized oil. This generator, called the
Haslar after the experimental station where it was
developed, weighed about one ton and was
mounted on either a trailer or a truck. Its role
was to screen ports and factories from Luftwaffe
observation and attack. It produced a fairly
effective smoke cloud in the anti-aircraft role for
which it was designed, although it covered nearby
buildings and gardens with a sooty layer of oil. It
was neither soldier-proof nor rugged enough for
field use. The United States Chemical Corps
developed and produced by contract to Standard
Oil a generator which produced superheated oil,
combined it with steam and sprayed it into the
air. This generator, known as the "Esso," was
mounted on a four-wheellow-bed trailer as a selfcontained unit, holding fog oil, fuel oil and water
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for about two hours' operation. The output was
variable. The Esso was standard in the U.S. Army
Chemical Corps Smoke Companies and was
issued to British Pioneer Corps Smoke
Companies serving outside the United Kingdom.
The Esso was supplemented in the last few
months of the war by the "Beslar," a miniaturized
version which could be carried by two men.
The Canadian army's first real experience
with large-scale tactical smoke screens was the
assault on Dieppe on 19 August 1942. In this
operation, known as "Jubilee," the RAF close
support included "smoke-laying aircraft to
neutralize enemy defences both as pre-arranged
and as requested by the Military Force
Commander." Three squadrons were allocated
to this task and in the actual operation supplied
support to the Royal Regiment of Canada landing
at Puys and the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry
and Essex Scottish landings on the beach directly
in front of the town of Dieppe. 1 Although the air
support was of some value, the inflexibility of
timing of the support substantially reduced its
effectiveness. Some aircraft did attempt to screen
the evacuation of casualties from the beach, but
with only limited success. The experience
reduced the confidence of the army in aerial
smoke support, a feeling which persisted
throughout the campaign in Northwest Europe.
To put the large-scale tactical smoke screens
used within First Canadian Army in Northwest
Europe into perspective, it is necessary to look
at the position of the Canadian Army in Britain

prior to the despatch of 1st Canadian Infantry
Division to the Mediterranean in 1943. In the
planning for the invasion of Europe Canada was
not seen as having any responsibility for the
provision of "Theatre" troops, or units directly
under Theatre Headquarters command. Smoke
troops were included in the order of battle of both
the British and US Army Groups with the
assigned task of screening beachheads and the
build-up of men and stores from German air
attack. Britain, the United States, and Canada
all had staff and technical staff officers trained
in chemical warfare defence at the various
formation headquarters. The US Army had a
"Chemical Officer" in the rank of colonel at each
division and in a correspondingly higher rank at
the corps and army level. These officers'
responsibilities included all aspects of chemical
warfare such as flame, protective measures
against chemical attack, analysis of captured
enemy ammunition, as well as planning and
execution of major smoke screens. The British
had a "Chemical Warfare Technical Officer" at
each corps headquarters, usually in the rank of
captain. If staff trained, he was called a "Technical
Staff Officer." The British had no such officers at
the divisional level, and only a small staff at
Second British Army Headquarters.
At First Canadian Army Headquarters,
Lieutenant-Colonel W.R. (Reg) Sawyer was the
GS01 (CW), ie. the grade one staff officer,
responsible for chemical warfare and smoke.
Sawyer had a staff of eleven all ranks, including
chemists, flame equipment and tactics
instructors, as well as officers trained in the
tactics, chemistry and the micro meteorology of
smoke screening. In addition, there was a mobile
Chemical Warfare Laboratory based at Army
Headquarters. With the exception of the 4th
Canadian Armoured Division, the Canadian and
British divisions did not have Technical Officers,
and this exception was as a result of the
insistence of Major-General G. Kitching, the
divisional commander.
I held the position of Technical Staff Officer
(Chemical Warfare) at Headquarters, II Canadian
Corps, and, commencing in March 1945 was
assisted by a Technical Officer. I was fortunate
in that I had completed the Canadian War Staff

Captain Jim Bond and Major Stewart Bastow. MC
during operations in the Rhineland. February 1945.
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Course in Kingston in 1943 and that, combined
with a B.A. and an M.A. in Chemistry, apparently
qualified me for the slightly better paid job of
"Technical Staff Officer," rather than a straight
"Technical Officer." I don't think that my duties
or responsibilities were ever spelled out in black
and white, but it was generally understood that
anything within the Corps that had to do with
chemical defence training and equipment,
flamethrower training, equipment and tactics,
and smoke screening, other than that produced
by the artillery or infantry, was, at least initially,
to be referred to me. This was pretty heady stuff
for a captain and it was quite humorous, and a
bit embarrassing, when the American 82nd and
101stAirborne Divisions came under command
of our Corps, and the two Divisional Chemical
Officers, both colonels. reported to the "Canadian
Corps Chemical Officer." Several years after the
war, when I was posted as liaison officer to the
U.S. Army Chemical Corps, I worked with both
these officers and we had many laughs about the
differences in rank.
Early in 1943 Lieutenant-Colonel Sawyer,
with the support ofGeneralA.G.L. McNaughton,
initiated trials to determine the practicality of
supporting river crossings and other operations
by producing smoke screens by methods not
requiring the use of artillery or other projectiles.
It had been recognized that artillery and mortars
could accomplish the task, but only at an
extremely high logistical cost, and the diversion
of these weapons from their role of firing high
explosive munitions. The actual "hands-on"
experience in planning and operating a large and
prolonged smoke screen was difficult to achieve
in southern England, and in fact only one fullscale combined trial and demonstration was
held. This was a simulated river crossing near
Edenbridge in Kent. This demonstration was
little short of a disaster, but the lessons learned
about smoke and fickle weather directions and
conditions proved invaluable in our actual
operations.
A review of the Canadian army participation
in the Italian campaign 2 shows that tactical
smoke screening was largely limited to artillery
support. at times on a massive scale, but no
record of prolonged screening in the Canadian
sector has been found. Artillery smoke screens
were mentioned by Nicholson in the Ortona, Liri
Valley, the Rimini Line and Romagna areas. Some

units, including the Royal Canadian Dragoons
were trained in the use of the No.24 British
Smoke Generators, but no successful operational
use was recorded. In fact the only reference to
generator smoke in the Dragoons' history is to
their lack of success. 3 In Italy the smoke
resources were more limited than in Northwest
Europe and of these some were retained in the
port areas as protection against enemy air attack.
The Canadian contribution to the D-Day
landing in Normandy was 3rd Infantry Division
supported by 2nd Armoured Brigade. In
addition, under command of 6th Airborne
Division, 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion
landed on D-Day on the extreme left flank of the
Allied operation. By 11 July II Canadian Corps
was operational and assumed command of these
formations, together with a normal complement
of corps troops. Second Canadian Infantry
Division and 4th Canadian Armoured Division
came under corps command as they joined the
force later in the month. Headquarters First
Canadian Army became operational on 23 July.
During this period, and extending until the
breakout from Normandy, the Canadian Army
made considerable use of artillery and other
projected smoke munitions. With the prevailing
winds being generally southerly and the enemy
positions close to the forward line of our troops
(the Allied advance was generally in a southerly
direction) there was little or no opportunity for
the tactical employment of non-projected smoke
stores.
Smoke screens were employed to conceal
against aerial attack and artillery shelling in the
Normandy beachhead, principally on the eastern
flank. 4 This screening was carried out by British
Royal Pioneer companies, specifically by
Numbers 806 and 112 companies. These two
companies were later involved in almost all the
tactical screens in the Canadian sector and they
brought with them many innovative ideas on how
to produce effective screens in adverse
conditions.

Tactics and Techniques
he basic tenet to be followed in the
employment of smoke screens is to
remember that smoke is a two-edged sword and
that in "blinding the enemy" one has to ensure
that the smoke does not hamper one's own

T
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operations. When using projected smoke
munitions one can actually place the smoke on
an enemy position or erect a screen between one's
own position and the enemy's points of
observation. Using smoke generators complicates
matters because the location of the smoke source
is restricted to a location controlled by friendly
forces, or which is not accessible to the enemy.
This constraint makes meteorological conditions
very important, as it is impossible to make a
smoke screen travel against the wind. Wind speed
is also a factor, as strong winds not only tear a
screen apart but also reduce the height of the
smoke cloud. There are other significant factors
such as humidity and air turbulence (caused by
strong sunlight or rough terrain), which have to
be taken into consideration when planning a
screen and deploying one's smoke and manpower
resources.
It is possible to calculate the size ( the length,
width and height) of a screen from a single source,
such as a No.24 generator, under known "met"
conditions. From that data an ideal source line,
consisting of smoke points of one generator each
can be plotted with a calculated distance between
the points. At this point in the plan the line and
the point spacing must be adjusted to sites that
are accessible and, if possible, not in full view of
the enemy. In some cases it may be necessary to
double the number of generators at a point and
increase the spacing between points. If using the
large Esso generators, it might be necessary to
establish a small preliminary screen with No.24s
to cover their move into position. Once a screen
was established and appeared stable it was
normal to analyze it in order to ensure that even
under moderately changed met conditions, or the
loss of one or more smoke points, the success of
the operation would not be jeopardized. One also
tried to be as economical as possible in the
expenditure of stores.

In actual practice a fair amount of
improvisation was required, such as the massing
of Essos at a single point at Wyler in the Rhine
operation to screen miles of flooded and semiflooded areas. The operations described below
give other examples of the techniques employed
to provide smoke support, as well as examples
of failure to do so.

Operation "Undergo"
Cap Gris Nez and Calais
~e

first use of smoke in Northwest Europe
to screen Canadian Army operations for a
prolonged period of several days, was in support
of the 3rd Canadian Division assault on Calais
in September 1944. It had been hoped that the
German force manning the batteries of large
calibre artillery located in emplacements in the
Cap Gris Nez area would have surrendered before
the assault on Calais was mounted, but an
unsuccessful night attack on 16 September, and
pressure from Headquarters 21 Army Group to
open all the Channel ports. forced a decision to
contain the Cap Gris Nez position and capture
Calais. To support the division and to minimize
casualties, the divisional artillery was augmented
to 19 regiments of field and medium artillery.
The optimum battery positions for this massed
artillery were in the Marquise-Mount Couple area
and were visible to the German guns at Cap Gris
Nez, at least one of which was capable of a 360degree traverse. 5

l.

On 19 September, as Technical Staff Officer,
II Canadian Corps, I was instructed to determine

if a smoke screen to shield the artillery from the
German battery was feasible. I made a
reconnaissance and studied prevailing wind
patterns. I then reported that there was a very
high probability that an effective smoke screen
could be laid and then more or less forgot about
the idea. At 1800 hours on 22 September I was
ordered to have a screen operational not later
than 0715 hours the next day. At this point there
were comparatively few smoke pots (British
No.24 generators), and no other smoke
generators available in the corps forward
maintenance area. Within two hours a
detachment of 23 gunners from the divisional
3rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment reported for
duty at Wissant where I had established a
command post. There were no NCOs, no cooks,
nor provision for any extended detached duty.
By 0400 hours smoke pots were arriving from
beachhead stocks in Normandy, and a smoke
source line some 3,000 yards long, with 51
smoke points at 50 yard spacing, was laid out.
The smoke pots were lit promptly at 0700 hours.
I then moved as close to the German positions
as I reasonably could to gauge how effective the

44
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smoke screen was and whether or not the
emission line should be moved or modified.
During the day the number of points was reduced
by trial and error to 18 without loss of
effectiveness. The whole "group" was organized,
shifts detailed. feeding arranged, and technical
support obtained in the persons of a
meteorological officer from Army Headquarters,
and one of the camouflage officers from Corps
Headquarters. The first day also saw us move
from our original base in the town of Wissant
because German sniping by one of the large
calibre guns had become decidedly
uncomfortable.

This first smoke operation. for which we were
not prepared, did teach us a number oflessons
directly related to the use of smoke stores, wind
variability, and ways of economizing both in
manpower and materials. It also made us
realize that there was a real need for a
meteorological officer in the planning and
maintenance of this type of smoke screen.
Probably more important was the recognition
by divisional and corps commanders (and their
staffs) of the utility and potential of prolonged
smoke screens. This recognition, in turn. led
to the transfer of some British Royal Pioneer
Smoke companies from Theatre to Army
control. and the movement forward to corps
dumps of substantial stocks of smoke stores.
In spite of our inexperience the screen was
considered to have been successful, and I was
pleasantly surprised to have been mentionedin-despatches for my part in the operation.

Operation "Switchback"
Part I - The Leopold Canal

l l

Tithin days a request from HQ 3rd Canadian

VV Infantry Division was received at II Corps

HQ for a smoke screen to support an assault
crossing of the Leopold Canal by 7th Canadian
Infantry Brigade. 6 This assault, made on 6
October, was the first major offensive action to
clear the land south of the Scheidt Estuary. which
became known as the "Breskens Pocket." The
initial assault consisted of two battalion
crossings, some two thousand yards apart.
Brigadier J. G. Spragge. commanding the brigade.

It had been originally planned to
maintain the screen for about a day and a
half, but as the assault on Calais slowed
down, orders came to maintain the screen
as long as our artillery was still in location
and Cap Gris Nez had not fallen. The screen
was maintained until noon on 28 September,
or for the daylight hours of over five days.
During this period the supply of smoke pots
was a constant worry. At one point some
German NbKL42 generators, similar to. but
inferior to, the British No.24s, were used. I
had identified these in a a German
ammunition dump at Elbeuf, on the Seine
River, when doing a routine check of
captured ammunition.

Canadians astride one of the captured German
guns at Cap Griz Nez
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wanted a smoke screen extending some four
miles to both the east and west of the planned
crossing points. He also wanted a screen in the
immediate area of the crossings to be available
and under his direct command. A reconnaissance
of the area indicated that, barring unfavourable
winds, the brigadiers's needs could be met by
the use of a pioneer smoke company, equipped
with 48 Esso oil smoke generators, and a platoon
with smoke pots and smoke floats. The Canadian
Army Meteorological Group forecast southerly
winds for the period of the assault and for two
or more days later. Brigadier Spragge agreed that
there should be no smoke if the winds were
northerly. No.806 Royal Pioneer Smoke Company
was put under command of First Canadian Army
in support of 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, and
placed under my operational control (not
command). It arrived late in the afternoon of 5
October. The smoke company commander and I
planned the company's deployment after making
a detailed reconnaissance. The deployment and
forward movement of fog oil reserve stocks was
completed by midnight 5/6 October. A weather
forecast obtained about 0300 hours called for a
change in wind direction to northerly, a shift
which was almost immediately noticeable locally
and which made the effective use of smoke
impossible. The assault was mounted and after
much bitter fighting the two battalion
bridgeheads were linked early on 9 October. The
smoke company remained at the alert, but as
the wind continued to be from the north no
smoke was made.

Part II- The Scheidt Estuary

second element of 3rd Division's
operation to clear the Breskens Pocket was
an amphibious assault by 9th Infantry Brigade
from the area ofTerneuzen, westward along the
south shore of the Scheidt, west across the
Braakman Inlet, and landing in the rear of the
main German defences. 7 Brigadier J.M.
Rockingham, commanding the brigade. wanted
smoke to screen the assault from observed fire
coming from enemy positions south of the
Scheidt, and from the coastal defence guns in
the area of Flushing. It was recognized that the
screen would have to be continued to conceal the
movement of reinforcements and supplies from
the same enemy fire. Brigadier Rockingham
stipulated that the smoke must not interfere with
the tracked landing vehicles (LVTs) known as
Buffalos, crossing from Terneuzen to the landing
beaches. The brigade staff confidently stated that
it was unlikely that the screen would be required
for more than 12 hours.

A

I was not involved in the initial planning of
the smoke support for the operation, because I
was occupied with the 7th Brigade operation at
the Leopold canal. Consequently, Major Temp
Hugill of the G(CW) staff at Army Headquarters,
and Captain Maurice Comfort, the Meteorological
Officer (CW) of the Army Meteorological Group,
planned and managed the screen in its initial
phases. They quickly realized that, to be effective.
the screen would have to be located on the
Scheidt Estuary itself. Planning proceeded on this
Bergen op Zoom
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With a smoke screen shielding their progress, soliders jrom the North Shore (New Brunswick) Regiment
areferriedfrom Terneuzen to Hoojdplaat aboard Buffalo amphibious vehicles, 11 October 1944.

basis, employing storm boats and DUKWs
(amphibious trucks) to drop off a smoke float
every 400 yards along a dog-leg line running
northwest from Terneuzen for some 8,000 yards.
These had to be renewed every 15 minutes, this
being the average smoke emission life of the
floats. An ad hoc smoke organization was formed
and equipped, consisting of three DUKWs with
drivers, four storm boats with crews, one NCO
and nine men as a working party, three wireless
operators with a wireless truck, and 800 smoke
floats. The brigade assault, which had been
planned for midnight 7 I 8 October, was postponed
24 hours. Due to the unfavourable northeast
wind, smoke was not made, although the group
stood to until 0200 hours. At 0400 hours the
plan for screening against fire from the south
shore of the Scheidt was modified to use three
Esso oil smoke generators, which had been
released from the Leopold Canal operation, sited
on the east shore of the mouth of the Braakman
Inlet.

his brigade had to be supplied by amphibians. It
was also learned that the 8th Canadian Infantry
Brigade was starting to phase its battalions in,
using the same route. Thus two brigades would
have to be maintained until a land route was
opened around the south end of the Braakman.
It was estimated that the screen would be
required for at least three more days.

At 0700 hours a call for smoke on both flanks
of the LVf route was received from brigade H Q
and was immediately acted on. As the screen
became effective the shelling of the beaches, the
LVT exits and the Braakman stopped. The enemy
on South Beveland (north of the the Scheidt) then
turned his attention to the smoke-laying craft,
and to the harbour at Terneuzen where our
smoke craft were based. A small secondary
screen in front of the harbour corrected the
problem, but only after casualties had occurred.

We requisitioned and received one platoon
of 806 Smoke Company ( 12 Esso generators), 3
DUKWs with operators, 4 storm boats with
crews, fitters, and extra motors, 8,000 smoke
floats, 4,000 No.24 generators, and 400 barrels
of fog oil. By this time our original stock of smoke
stores was very low, good for less than six hours
of operation. During the next week the wind blew
from all points of the compass, necessitating
constant adjustment of the smoke emission lines.
This entailed constant revision of estimates of
stores requirements, and of devising innovative
ways of using combinations of devices to produce
effective screens consuming a minimum of stores.
When a shortage of smoke floats developed, our

That evening (9 October) Brigadier
Rockingham requested that the screen be
continued during daylight hours for as long as

The extension of the duration of the screening
meant that manpower and material resources
had to be substantially increased. Captain Norm
Mould, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division CW
Technical Officer was "requisitioned," and I was
able to leave the Leopold Canal operation. He
and I assumed responsibility for the details of
screening operations, while Major Hugill
remained in overall command of the group. Major
Stew Bastow, DSO, a free-thinking Australian and
the officer commanding the 806 Pioneer Smoke
Company, was an important addition to our
planning and operations group.

47
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sappers and pioneers built a number of rafts,
using oil drums, scavenged lumber, and wire
mesh. These were anchored in the Scheidt,
loaded with No.24 generators, and a Pioneer to
light the generators. After an incident in which a
large calibre near-miss capsized a raft with a
Pioneer and me on it, a method of chain lighting
the No.24s and eliminating the man on the raft
was quickly devised. The Esso generator was
found to be extremely versatile. It fitted nicely in
the back of a Mark IV LVT Buffalo, which could
carry additional fog oil injerricans. Also it was
found only a few days later, that the Esso could
be mounted in an Assault Landing Craft (LCA),
the only modification necessary being the cutting
out of a part of the LCA deck. The D UKWs were
very useful for carrying and dropping off smoke
floats. Also, with No.24s burning on a metal plate
welded to the stern, they could simulate a naval
"destroyer smoke screen." In contrast, the storm
boats were unsatisfactory, the main problem
being their outboard motors, which proved
unreliable if run for prolonged periods.
On 16 October there was a link-up of 7th and
9th Brigades, thus providing a land route for
supply, and the smoke screen was no longer
needed for its original purpose. The II Corps
Headquarters staff agreed with our
recommendation that, in view of future
operations against South Beveland, a screen
should be kept at Terneuzen. with a more
westerly screen maintained for deception
purposes, and to draw fire from the enemy
coastal guns so that they could be taken out by
aerial attack. This last objective was not attained,
although the enemy wasted over 100 medium and
large calibre shells.

Operation "Vitality"
South Beveland

P'"""f"he participation of the "Smoke Group" in the
~ taking of South Beveland and Walcheren was
comparatively minor. It was not involved in the
advance of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division as
it fought against a determined enemy. To turn
the German right or southern flank, an
amphibious assault across the Scheidt was made
by the 156th (Lowland) Brigade of the British
52nd Lowland Division. This division, which was
under the command of II Canadian Corps, had
been specially trained in mountain warfare, but
was fighting for the first time on terrain largely
below sea level. The assault, supported by DD

tanks (Duplex Drive amphibious Shermans) of
the South Staffordshire Regiment, took place
in the early hours of 26 October. There were
two separate landings, both to the northeast
of Terneuzen. Flank screens were provided,
partly by Essos mounted in LCAs. and partly
by No.24s on the flank of the landing beach. 8
The screens were modified as progress was
made by the 156th Brigade, with the gradual
elimination of the eastern screen. The
westernmost screen was maintained until 31
October when the guns of Walcheren were no
longer considered a threat. Of particular
interest to me was the sight of an officer of 806
Pioneer Company with a detachment of his men
coming ashore on the extreme left flank of the
assault, casually picking up a couple of No.24
generators each, trudging up the beach,
lighting the 24s, and then nonchalantly lighting
up cigarettes. All this was against a background
of the infantry doing a classical fire and
movement advance up the beach. (This incident
is recorded inA War History ofthe Royal Pioneer
Corps 1939-1945, which states that the beach
was under heavy fire). 9

Operation "Infatuate"
The Assault on Flushing

he final chapter of the "Scheidt Smoke
Screen Story" was the support given the
155th (Lowland) Brigade and No.4 Commando
of the 4th Special Service Brigade assault on
Flushing from the port of Breskens on l
November. This was one half of the assault on
the island of Walcheren. the other being a
seaborne attack by the 4th British Special Service
Brigade on the coastal area around Westkapelle.
Air smoke had been planned for the Westkapelle
operation, but was aborted on account of bad
weather. The smoke plan for the Flushing
operation was quite straightforward, calling for
screens flanking a corridor from Breskens to
Flushing, with the stipulation that there should
be absolutely no smoke in Breskens harbour or
in the corridor. The brigade commander finally
accepted the fact that if the wind was westerly.
some smoke was bound to blow into the corridor,
but he insisted that he have a direct radio link to
that screen sector so he could order a shut down
at short notice.

T

The assault on Flushing started on schedule
on l November at 0530 hours. There was no
enemy shelling of the Breskens harbour or the
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"Esso ·· smoke generators in operation along a dyke west oj Terneuzen, 13 October 1944.
Photo by D.I. Granl. NAC PA 136818

corridor until about 1020 hours, whereupon
the brigade commander together with the
Naval-Officer-in-Charge asked for smoke even
if, with the current northerly wind, it blinded
the Breskens harbour. The hostile fire switched
targets from the harbour and the corridor,
concentrating on the smoke-laying LCA. The
screen was maintained until about 1600 hours
when enemy action holed the LCA smoke layer.
The craft made it close to the beach near
Breskens and the whole crew were able to swim
ashore. (The water in the Scheidt in November
is cold!) By this time the batteries that had been
firing on Breskens had been overrun or silenced
and the smoke operation was closed. Thus ended
a month of long, nightly drives to obtain
meteorological data, of spending most of the
daylight hours afloat, and of improvising to make
stores last and inadequate equipment work. On
the other side of the ledger, we were confident
that the smoke operation reduced Canadian and
Allied casualties and substantially assisted the

operations. There was also the privilege of
working with dedicated companions and Pioneer
troops, who, General Dempsey said, "set a
splendid example in keeping with the highest
tradition of their Corps. " 10 A further bonus was
the daily rum issue for being "waterborne."
In the operations on the Scheidt in October
1944, over 500 tons of smoke materials were
consumed, and smoke screens were laid on 29
days of the month. A point of which I am most
proud is that we had no fatal casualties in our
smoke troops over this period.

Winter Operations

I\ fter the Battle of the Scheidt the Canadian
.1""\ctivisions were shifted northeastwards to the
Nijmegen salient, and offensive operations were
limited to "active patrolling," which nonetheless
at times involved very bitter fighting and heavy
casualties. Second Canadian Corps took over the
Nijmegen salient from 30 British Corps in early
49
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November 1944 and, with some shifting of
divisions, was responsible for the line of the Maas
River some ten miles southeastwards from
Nijmegen and westwards beyond 's-Hertogenbosch. To the west of this I British Corps, under
command of First Canadian Army, had an area
of responsibility westwards to the coast. The
winter period of strategic planning for operations
to clear the area westwards from the Rhine River
to the Maas River gave the chemical warfare staffs
an opportunity to analyze past smoke operations,
and to decide what organization would be
necessary to implement any large-scale screening
that might be ordered in the expectation of a
major Allied offensive. The Ardennes offensive
launched by Germany on 16 December 1944
delayed the Allies' offensive. Operation
"Veritable," designed to clear the west bank of
the Rhine, was launched 8 February 1945.
In this winter period there was real concern
that the enemy might attempt to destroy one of
the bridges over the Waal River at Nijmegen by
aerial attack or by observed artillery fire. 11 In
September the Germans made an attempt, using
naval mines positioned by divers. This was
partially successful, but later attempts were less
so. Similarly. an aerial attack by 73 aircraft was
a failure. To counter the aerial threat the Allies
planned to conceal the bridges by smoke. Trial
runs were made, using different deployments of
the Essos, while I observed the screens from an
aircraft. We soon found that, in winter conditions
in the Netherlands, the smoke hung close to the
ground. leaving the bridge superstructure highly
visible as an isolated target.
On the personal side, I applied for and
attended a course at the Royal Engineer "Mine
and Booby-Trap" school at Knocke-sur-Mer in
Belgium. Within weeks this proved to be worth
the effort.

Operation "Elephant"
Kapelsche Veer
rr'fle most disappointing, and tragic smoke
1. support task with which I was involved took
place on 26 January in the 30 British Corps area
to the western or left flank of our corps. A few
miles northwest of's-Hertogenbosch the Maas
River divides forming a small island several miles
long and about a mile wide. The island is very
flat and typical polder terrain. On the north side
of the island at about mid-point in its length is a

small ferry harbour called Kapelsche Veer. The
enemy had occupied this area since September
1944 in spite of attempts to dislodge him by the
1st Polish Armoured Division and Ia ter by 4 7
Royal Marine Commando. This led I British
Corps to order the 4th Canadian Armoured
Division, which was under its command, to carry
out a full-fledged assault, supported by all the
corps artillery, and as the weather allowed, daily
aerial bombing. The Lincoln and Weiland
Regiment of the 1Oth Canadian Infantry Brigade
was given the lead role. 12 Coincidentally, I had
been commissioned in the "Lines" in 1936, and
in militia days had run a qualification course for
officers that had included Major Jim Swayze, who
in January 1945 was the acting commanding
officer of the Regiment.
The assault on 26 January was planned as a
pincer movement from the east and west ends of
the island, with a third force, in canoes, landing
behind the enemy position at the harbour. 1:1 The
smoke support was intended to screen the land
attacks and the canoe force from observation by
positions north of the river. It was also meant to
blind the enemy positions on the island until the
attacking forces had closed with them. To
accomplish this, a mixture of smoke sources was
used, including Essos, Beslars, and U.S. Army
M4A2 floating smoke pots. In addition British
smoke pots were loaded in canoes that were then
pushed out onto the river. The wind was easterly
as forecast. but very light and variable with the
result that the screening effect was not
dependable. It never did screen the canoe force.
As the Lines war diary stated: ·'the smoke .. .failed
to give the proper support at the right spot at the
right time." 14 The elaborate plans for the
operation changed in the afternoon to a slow,
methodical digging out of the enemy, slit trench
by slit trench. In this type of action, no role was
seen for the smoke unit and it was stood down,
but remained in position until noon of the 27th.
From the 27th through the 30th the Lines, with
the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada,
supported by the tanks of the South Alberta
Regiment, fought against a determined enemy,
finally declaring the island cleared of live enemy
shortly after midnight 30/31 January. The cost
in human life was grim, the Lines having 183
casualties, of which 50 were fatal. including seven
officers. The losses ofthe Argylls and the South
Albertas were substantial. The commander of the
German defending force, the 6th Parachute
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Division, estimated that his casualties were
between 300 and 400.

Operation "Veritable"
The Battle of the Rhineland

n a paper describing a particular type of
support, such as tactical smoke, supplied to a
major military operation one must assume that
the reader has either some knowledge of the
overall campaign or has access to a good textbook
describing it. This is particularly true in the case
of Operation "Veritable," the object of which was
the clearing of the west side of the Rhine River. It
is also impractical to describe all the extensions
and modifications that were made to the
deployment of smoke lines and resources made
over the seven-week period during which the
screen and its contiguous successors were
maintained.

I

In early January 1945, the Army
Headquarters CW staff was tasked to determine
how tactical smoke could best be employed in
Operation "Veritable." A study clearly showed that
screening the activities of the division on the left
flank of the operation from observation from the
north bank of the Rhine, and in particular from
high ground known as Hoch Elten, would
contribute substantially to the success of the
operation. 15 The discovery some time later of a
German panoramic sketch made from an
artillery observation post on Hoch Elten
confirmed our thinking. A Smoke Group,
consisting of Headquarters, Smoke Control, 803
and 810 Smoke Companies of the Royal Pioneer
Corps, and 112 Pioneer Company (Smoke), also

of the Royal Pioneer Corps, was assembled. The
headquarters was under command of Major J.T.
(Temp) Hugill, RCA, with Major Stewart Bastow
of the Pioneer Corps coordinating the smoke
companies' activities. Captain Peter Claridge, the
Technical Officer from 30 Corps, and I were
responsible for ensuring that the smoke units'
actions produced the desired results, and if not,
for altering the plan. The headquarters had its
own meteorological officer, Captain Comfort, and
a staff captain, Captain Birks, responsible for
logistics. When it had been established that our
old friends, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division,
was to be on the left flank, we arranged to have a
platoon of their Engineers attached, as well as
ten Universal Carriers and drivers from 7th
Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment (17th Duke
of York Royal Canadian Hussars) to move smoke
stores in the forward polder country. A radio link
on the 3rd Division command net, manned by
divisional signalers, was provided. Also four 15
cwt armoured trucks were obtained for smoke
line reconnaissance and transport of smoke pots.
The orders from Major-General Dan Spry, the
GOC of 3rd Division, were short and to the point:
"The Smoke Group will support 3 Canadian
Infantry Division by providing a smoke haze over
the divisional area." 'The best laid plans o' mice
an' men gae aft agley" is the best way of describing
the start of the operation on 8 February. The
flooding of the area from the Rhine to the
Nijmegen-Cleve road, and the softening of ground
due to a thaw and some rain, made many of the
routes planned in January useless. On 3
February alternate plans, based on the land being

Waimvrigl1t Park on the Rhine, February 1945 where the LVT4 Bulfioes came to pick up
smoke stores. The vehicle on the right is a Buffalo, and to the left is a pile of No.24 pots.
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An aerial view of a smoke screen laid down along the Rhine River near Cleve to hide Canadian troops
advancing up io the southern side of the river, 14 February 1945. The extensive flooding of the area is
evident in this photo.

"soft-going," had been developed, and all
amphibious vehicles available within 21 Army
Group (79th Armoured Division LVTs and Royal
Army Service Corps DUKWs) had been
earmarked and moved into the Nijmegen area.
At this point I must mention the massive smoke
screen produced by the massed artillery of about
one thousand guns of many calibres. Very early
in the morning of 8 February these guns had been
employed in harassing enemy headquarters and
communications, silencing his artillery and
smashing his defences. At 07 40 hours, a massive
smoke screen was laid down, using all weapons
that could fire this ammunition and covering the
entire front. Then there was a lull in the firing,
during which the sound-ranging units located
many enemy artillery locations, because the
Germans, expecting an immediate attack, had
brought down defensive fire. Following this lull,
our artillery resumed fire, concentrating on the
identified enemy artillery locations. The time of
the actual assault was 1030 hours, but the
supporting fire started an hour earlier, with
smoke mixed in with the high explosive to conceal
the assault battalions of the four divisions as they
moved to their start lines.
For the smoke troops, the flooding confined
the smoke lines to dikes and the areas to the
south ofthe flooding, such as the towns of Wyler
and Donsbruggen. Gaps in the dikes made some
sectors inaccessible to the smoke companies, but
division headquarters considered the smoke
screen to be sufficiently important to allocate 12

LVT4s (Buffalos) to Headquarters Smoke
Control on a full time basis. The Buffalos were
used to transport smoke stores and also
Universal Carriers to the dikes, and then the
carriers were used to distribute the smoke pots
along the dikes, often under small arms fire
from the north of the river.
Driving an LVT along roads covered with
water, but not deep enough to float the LVT,
proved to be exciting, as many of the roads were
mined. On one occasion I thanked "Someone on
High" that I had taken the mines course, because
I recognized the end of a Regelmine on the road
ahead, partly buried in straw and weeds. I was
able to scream at the driver who slewed the
vehicle. We hit the mine, but only obliquely so
we had no one killed, although the driver was
badly hurt. Our smoke lines on the outer or
winter dikes were attacked by German patrols
from north of the river, but these were driven off
by the combined action of the infantry and our
pioneers.
As the smoke emission line along the dike
grew in length it became more and more difficult
to supply. Recalling the long screens produced
by massed Essos on the Scheidt, I recommended
trying the same technique over the flooded land
and the Rhine River. We established two points,
one each at the villages of Wyler and
Donsbruggen, with 12 Essos at each point, and
determined under what wind conditions the
points should be operated. We also set up a third
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point to cater for wind variations. We were
blessed with favourable winds almost all the time
that the screen was required. As long as the
atmosphere was not turbulent. screens up to
15.000 yards were attained. This would not have
been possible in the mountainous terrain of Italy
or the hot summer conditions of Normandy.
The screen. which was operated originally to
defeat enemy observation of our attacking troops.
assumed a secondary role - that of concealing
the Corps Forward Maintenance Centre in and
around Cleve. This required a screen to be
continuously effective throughout the daylight
hours, as once located through a gap in a screen,
supply dumps could be fired on even after the
screen had been re-established. Camouflage of
the dumps and the layout of dummy dumps
helped to reduce this hazard somewhat.
The combined Anglo-Canadian force,
according to C.P. Stacey, slowly clawed its way
upstream on the southeast bank of the Rhine,
by 20 February having only advanced between

15 and 20 miles from the start-line, with the
enemy still maintaining an unbroken front. Ahead
of our troops lay the formidable defensive line
known as the Hochwald Layback. It consisted of
several lines of entrenchments, about one-half
mile apart, with anti-tank ditches and wire
between the trenches. Rather than continuing to
push forward with the same divisions,
Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, GOC II
Canadian Corps, decided to launch a fresh
offensive called "Blockbuster" using 4th
Canadian and 11th British Armoured Divisions.
The first objective of this thrust, made on 26
February, was to secure the ridge between Udem
and Calcar with the ultimate objective being the
capture of the Xanten area. No call for smoke to
support this action was made until 7 March,
when the l29th Brigade of the 43rd Division,
which was on the extreme left flank of the front,
hard against the Rhine, asked for a screen to
conceal its attack towards Xanten. The enemy
fire was coming from the other side of the Rhine,
and the probable fire control was from one or
more observation posts located in tall buildings
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Tile effectiveness of smoke screens at masking ground operations is apparent
from this aerial view of the battlefield near Udem, 15 March 1945.

in the town of Bislich (on the east bank of the
river). A Smoke Control was located at the
brigade headquarters and 803 Smoke Company
established two smoke points, one with 11 Essos,
and the other with 24 Beslars (Esso's little
brother) well behind the start line, and very close
to the river. On the morning of the 8th, the wind
was from the northwest as predicted, and the
screen carried along the river beautifully,
blanketing Bislich but not obscuring the brigade
start line or the vision of the direct fire weapons
supporting the attack. Although much ofXanten
was cleared on the 8th, the screen was
maintained through the 9th and 1Oth to conceal
the main road from Marienbaum to Xanten from
observed fire.
una personal note, 1 must add that I did not
plan this screen because I had been in England
testing and approving some modifications to the
smoke dischargers fitted to the Wasp IIC
flamethrowers. I arrived back at Smoke Control
to find that 129 Brigade had requested that I run
the screen. This was about eight hours before
the screen was to be operational. I had not
realized until then what a strain it was to be
suddenly rushed into action after being out of it
for two or three days. In spite of the strange
feeling in my stomach, and thanks to a Captain
Davies of the Pioneer Smoke Company, we
managed to please our customer, and I believe,
substantially reduce both observed enemy fire
and casualties therefrom.

Screens in Support of 30 Corps

'l l

]bile the northern or left flank of the Allied
being obscured from enemy
observation by a comparatively massive screen,
30 British Corps, and in particular its 51st
Highland Division, was having water trouble
several miles to the south. This was due to
flooded land, a swollen River Niers, and blown
bridges. Late on 12 February, I was detailed, with
a detachment of the 112 Pioneer Company
(Smoke), to try at first light, the next day, to
"smoke" a damaged bridge and bridging site in
the town of Gennep. On arrival it was obvious
that, with the existing wind and rain conditions,
the smoke points had to be located where the
land was flooded. We found two engineer assault

VV assault was

l."...J'u.lv, yu_L u.luyv..L vl vvvl vcu.ll.ll.l.l Lln:::: lJvaL;o:, .fVl

insulation and loaded the boats with smoke pots
(no floating pots being available). Because I did
know something about canoes and boats and
paddles, whereas the Pioneer officer could not
even swim, I got the boat out to position with the
help of a couple of Pioneers and lit the pots. The
plan was to resupply with a second boat but, due
to an inexperienced crew, the second boat did
not arrive to take us off our craft until after an
alert German Forward Observation Officer had
used us for target practice. The shelling got close
to us, but fortunately we had no casualties. By
mid-morning the wind had changed. and a screen
was maintained all day by more conventional
means. On request the screen was kept going the
following day to conceal traffic using the bridges.
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Evidently these troops, or their commanders,
thought that smoke was useful. because we were
asked to put up a screen to cover their main
maintenance route between Gennep and Hekkens,
both of which are located southwest of the
Reichswald Forest

Operation "Plunder"
The Rhine Crossing

'l 1

Tith the final clearing of the west bank of the
all activity was devoted to the
preparation of men and material for the actual
assault across the Rhine. During the conduct of
Operation "Veritable,·· II Canadian Corps had
established a Forward Maintenance Centre (FMC)
in the Cleve area and this had been screened from
enemy observation from Hoch Elten since the early
days of that operation. On 10 March Second
British Army took over the Rhine bank from
Emmerich south to Buderich. An integral part of
the build-up was a large-scale deception plan to
lead the enemy into believing that the assault
would be in the Emmerich area, whereas the
actual crossing was planned for an area further
south near Bislich and Rees. For this plan, gun
areas and material stocks around Cleve were
largely dummy, while the real ones to the south
were very carefully concealed and camouflaged.
An elaborate smoke screen was operated from
west of Cleve up the Rhine to near Xanten, where
it joined aU .S. Army screen covering the American
sector. This screen made headlines in the British
Army newspaper "Soldier," and in English
newspapers generally, as a "man-made sixty six
mile long fog." Realizing that a cessation of smoke
might be interpreted by the enemy as meaning
that an assault was imminent, a plan to keep the
enemy guessing was devised by instituting a
schedule of"smoke" and "no-smoke" days. It was
also hoped that this action might draw enemy fire
and thus assist in locating enemy artillery
locations for counter-battery purposes.

VV Rhine,

Because II Canadian Corps was not involved
in the initial amphibious assault on 23 March,
the Smoke Control Headquarters, and most of the
smoke companies, were transferred to the
operational control of Second British Army. This
was accomplished with no confusion, or loss of
effectiveness. We did have one problem on 24
March when the smoke interfered with the
airborne landing east of the Rhine in the area of
Hamminkeln. The landing was at 1000 hours, as

planned, and the orders we had received were
to have the smoke clear of the landing zones
by that time. We had anticipated this, when
the day dawned with practically no wind, by
cutting off all smoke generation by 0700
hours; but some smoke was still hanging in
the drop zone at the time of the landing. In
1995 I met one of the glider pilots in Ottawa
at the Canadian War Museum and he
confirmed that the smoke had been a problem
in identifying the landing zone. In this
operation the role of the smoke was more
deceptive than protective, but it was
considered by the formation commanders to
have been a contributing factor to the success
of the operation.

The Support of Canal Crossings

I\ fter the Rhine crossing in late March the
.r-\operations of II Canadian Corps became
more fluid as the advance veered northwards.
The country was interlaced with canals, some
large and some small. Regardless of the width
of the canal, unless a bridge could be seized, it
was necessary for the infantry to establish a
bridgehead by assault boat or by using the
remains of a partially demolished bridge. As
soon as possible a Bailey bridge was
constructed. Almost all of these crossings were
opposed, some of them bitterly, as George
Blackburn describes in his The Guns of Victory
in writing about the crossing of the Twente canal
near the village of Almen by the 2nd Division. 16
On the evening of 3 April I was ordered to screen
this bridging site, and to establish any dummy
or decoy screens that I might think would divert
enemy fire. A detachment of 803 Smoke
Company, using a combination of smoke pots
and floating pots to both the east and west of
the bridging site, was ready to make smoke at
0700 hours, but we were requested not to start
smoke at that time. At about 1000 hours, enemy
shelling began and smoke was called for. The
screen was lit, as was a dummy some distance
to the east, where there was another possible
bridging site. The screens were maintained until
last light 6 April when the danger of enemy fire
had abated. I must give due credit to the officers
and men of the Royal Regiment of Canada who
made the initial crossing, and to the Forward
Observation Officer of 4 RCHA who
accompanied them. This was one of the
crossings that was very bitterly opposed!
55
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Esso generator emitting smoke in the town of Wyler
on the Dutch-German border, 10-12 February 1945.

Two other bridging operations were
similarly supported, using the same smoke
company: one, on 6 April, a second crossing of
the Twente Canal by 7 Brigade of the 3rd
Division; and the other, on 8 April, a crossing
of a nearby canal by 6 Brigade of the 2nd
Division. In all these cases the troops claimed
that we reduced casualties substantially.

Operation "Cannonshot"
Crossing the Ijssel River
he last major smoke screen conducted
under the auspices of II Canadian Corps was
in the liberation of the Netherlands. This was in
support of the lst Canadian Infantry Division,
freshly arrived from Italy, which had come under
command of the corps for the purpose of clearing
the enemy from an area west of the Ijssel River
and striking westwards to Apeldoorn. The
crossing was to be about five miles north of the
city ofZutphen, on ll April at 1630 hours. The
crossing was made using LVTs and assault boats.

T

The screening requirement was for a smoke
box around the proposed bridgehead, to be

maintained until the assaulting troops were "firm
on the ground." As the assault was westward and
the wind was extremely variable, a joint smoke
plan was worked out with the divisional artillery,
whereby the guns undertook to produce the far
side of the box and we, using mainly smoke pots,
provided its sides. 17 Again, to cater for wind
changes, both in speed and direction, other plans
were arranged with the artillery. This too was the
first opportunity to make use of a new "toy," a
4-inch naval smoke mortar. which lobbed a ten
pound smoke pot up to about 2,000 yards. This
was used to provide temporary smoke cover
under which a normal smoke point could be
established and dug in. The mortar was fired
from the bed of my 15 cwt. armoured truck, and
worked very well. An interesting point about this
smoke operation is that it was the first time it
was possible to make a fair comparison in the
tonnages of smoke stores and ammunition. The
artillery fired about 100 tons of smoke
ammunition and we used between 10 and 11 tons
of smoke stores. In this operation the artillery
screen was about half the length of the of the
generator screen, and was of slightly shorter
duration. Of course, the artillery was invaluable
in reaching points that we could not.
The screen was modified several times as the
wind veered and backed, and the cooperative
effort with the gunners, based on the pre-planned
alternatives, worked well. There was shelling into
the bridging area, but it was determined that it
was part of a predicted fire plan and not observed
fire. The screen was maintained until dark, with
the exception of part of the artillery screen. The
next morning all screening on the right flank was
discontinued, but the southern flank screen was
maintained because a probable enemy
observation post in the outskirts ofZutphen was
still in German hands.

Operation "Anger"
The Assault on Arnhem
hile II Canadian Corps was moving
northward after crossing the Rhine at
Emmerich, I Canadian Corps which had just
arrived from the Italian Campaign was given the
task of capturing Arnhem. This move had left
the island between Arnhem and Nijmegen in the

W
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hands of the British 49th Division and the 12th
Manitoba Dragoons. The south bank of the
Neder Rijn was cleared by 2 April by a mix of
Canadian and British units, but offensive
action to take Arnhem was delayed some 10
days in order to coordinate the attack with
operations north of Emmerich. The original
plan called for a crossing of the Rhine to the
west of Arnhem and a smoke screen to conceal
preparations for the assault was established,
stretching from Randwijk, about 10 miles west
of Arnhem, along the south bank of the Neder
Rijn, to Huissen, south of Arnhem. It was
envisaged that the screen would be required
for about 10 days. Because the area to be
smoked was continuously occupied by our
troops, smoke pots were not to be used due to
the irritancy of their smoke. The smoke plan
adopted was to establish several "beaming
points," with Essos to cover the western sector
of the screen, and a line of Essos running
northwest from Huissen for the eastern sector.
When the assault plan was changed to an
attack from Westerwoort (which is southeast of
and across the Ijssel River from Arnhem). it was
decided to maintain the screen to deceive the
Germans as to the point of the attack. This
deception was improved by having heavy and
noisy vehicle movement in the Oriel area. This
screen was operated from 2 April until the
afternoon of the 14th, and it did divert German
artillery fire from the real crossing site. The
operational order called for artillery smoke to
screen the right flank of the crossing of the Ijssel.
To reduce the requirement for smoke
ammunition and to free the artillery for high
explosive shoots, a smoke source was
established, but not started on the 13th due to
unfavourable winds. The artillery expended
30,000 smoke shells in maintaining this screen
for the daylight hours of the 13th and early
morning of the 14th, when the wind allowed the
generator smoke screen to be effective. Smoke
was continued until late afternoon on the 14th
when it was considered that Arnhem and its
suburbs were completely cleared of German
troops.
This smoke operation was conducted by
Captain G.K. Wright of I Canadian Corps
Headquarters with a small Headquarters Smoke
Control complete with a meteorological officer
and communications personnel. The Royal

Pioneer Smoke Companies involved were the 810
and 845 and a detachment of the 803. Total
casualties in the smoke companies were eight
wounded, none of which were fatal. In spite of
the inability to conduct the smoke operation
completely as planned, due to the wind, it was
considered a success.

Operation "Duck"
The Assault on the Town of Leer
~e 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, i~ its drive
J. northwards into the western portiOn of the
Wilhelmshaven peninsula to capture Emden, had
first to clear a crossing of the Ems River and
capture the town of Leer which was located at
the junction of the Leda and Ems Rivers. Smoke
support was requested by Brigadier Rockingham,
commanding 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade.
H-hour for the assault across the Ems River was
1500 hours on 28 April. Smoke was planned for
and started at 1430 hours, but was only
marginally effective because the wind was
extremely variable and grew more so, losing
direction altogether. With the approval of the
brigade commander, the smoke was cut off in
the various sectors, as the smoke from each
sector threatened to interfere with the operation.
Thus ended, on a somewhat less than perfect
note, the smoke operations of II Canadian Corps
and the screens that had grown to be on an army
scale, or were contagious, being copied by
flanking formations. In conclusion, besides the
other smoke staff and our faithful Royal Pioneer
Corps companies, I must thank Major-General
Elliot Rodger, C.B.E., Chief of Staff, II Canadian
Corps, for his support throughout the entire
campaign. He always asked me for my opinion
as to whether a request for smoke support could
be expected to be filled, and at what cost. An
example of this occurred a few days before
VE-Day, when the lst Polish Armoured Division,
on the right flank of the 3rd Canadian Infantry
Division, asked for smoke support for their
crossing of the Leda River. As usual, I made a
reconnaissance of the area and reported that if
we took on the job we were bound to have heavy
casualties and had only a very low probability of
doing any good. General Rodger accepted my
appreciation and told the Poles that a screen was
"not on." It is highly probable that his decision
saved my life!
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Notes

This paper is primarily based on a 1945 report on the
smoke screens which in turn was composed of edited
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Dedication
This account of large-scale tactical smoke screens
carried out by First Canadian Army in Northwest
Europe in 1944-1945 is dedicated to the following
officers of the First Canadian Army and to the units
and detachments of the Royal Navy. the British Army
(particularly the Royal Pioneer Corps) and to all those
unnamed individuals whose support was essential to
the success of the operations.
Lieutenant-Colonel W.R. Sawyer, OBE. ED.
RCE. GSO 1 CW First Canadian Army
Major J.T. Hugill, MBE. RCA. GS02 CW First
Canadian Army
Major W.H. Taylor Gen. List. Technical Officer
CW First Canadian Army
Capt. H.W. Peck RCA Technical Officer CW
First Canadian Army
Capt. G.K. Wright. MC. CICTechnical Officer
CW I Canadian Corps
Capt. A.M. Birks Gen. List. Technical Officer
CW II Canadian Corps
Capt P.R.P. Claridge RE Technical Officer CW
XXX British Corps
Capt. N.L.J. Mould. MC Gen. List Technical
Officer CW 4th Canadian Armoured
Division
Capt. M.E. Comfort. RCA. Meteorological
Officer (CW). 1 Canadian Army
Meteorological Group
Major S.Bastow, DSO. RE, Senior Royal
Pioneer Corps Officer
All the officers and men of 803, 805. 806. 810 and 845
Smoke Companies and 112 Pioneer Company (Smoke).

Colonel J.C. Bond, MC, CD (ret'd)
[at left shown standing beside a
Beslar Smoke Generator in the
collection of the CWM] served as
Technical Staff Officer (CW) HQ
2nd Canadian Corps. Jim Bond
continued to serve in the Canadian
army after the war, specializing in
chemical warfare and smoke
screens. He retired in 1958 in the
rank of colonel. He lives in Ottawa
and is an active member of the
Friends of the Canadian War
Museum.
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